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Abstract
We use game theory and experimental economics approaches to analyze the rela-
tionships between corporate culture and the persistent performance differences among
seemingly similar enterprises. First, we show that competition leads to higher minimum
effort levels in the minimum effort coordination game. This implies that, organizations
with competitive institutional design are more likely to have better coordination, hence
better performance outcome. Furthermore, we show that organizations with better co-
ordination also lead to higher rates of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. This
supports the theory that the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games act
as a focal point for the outcome of subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game. In turn, we argue
that these endogenous features of culture developed from coordination and cooperation
can help explain the persistent performance differences.
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1 Introduction
Industrial, labor, and organizational economists are intrigued by the existence of persis-
tent performance differences (PPD) among seemingly similar enterprises (SSE). Many
empirical researches demonstrated that performance differences do exist, whether mea-
sured in productivity or profit in various sectors of industry. These results are prevalent
between and within countries and even at the more narrow level of 5-digit industries.
For example, there is a 156% difference in productivity between the top 10 and bottom
10 decile in UK manufacturing industries (Disney, Haskel, and Heden 2003), corporate
effects alone can explain up to 18% of variance in profit in the US (Brush, Bromiley,
and Hendrickx (1999) and Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall (1996)), and initial defect
rates varies by factor of five in the semiconductor manufacturing industry (Macher and
Mowery 2003). We refer the readers to an excellent survey paper by Gibbons, Henderson,
Repenning, and Sterman (In Press) for a more detailed discussion of empirical results
regarding performance differences.
Because an organization is in essence a repeated game, the folk theorem argues that
any outcome we observe is just different equilibria reached by the organizations. This
paper takes it one step further and states how certain equilibrium results may occur. Var-
ious studies explained some of the reasoning behind the PPD among SSE. For example,
in addition to Gibbons, Henderson, Repenning, and Sterman (In Press), Bloom and van
Reenen (2007) presents well-studied empirical data which argues that management skills
are part of the explanation for PPD.1 However, management skill is just another form of
∗I owe many thanks to Charlie Plott, Jaksa Cvitanic, Colin Camerer, Joseph Wang, Matt Rabin,
Tom Palfrey, Andrea Mattozzi, Federico Echenique and Eileen Chou for their helpful comments and
discussions. The experiments were graciously funded by Charlie Plott. I am also grateful to seminar
participants at Caltech, UMASS, Fordham University, Naval Postgraduate School, UCSD Rady, George
Mason University IFREE, ESA North American Meeting and ESA International Meeting.
†Email: noah.myung@caltech.edu. Phone: 626-395-8772. Web: www.hss.caltech.edu/∼noah and at
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business and Public Policy starting Fall 2009.
1In fact, they detail other interesting results. US companies are usually better managed, competition
leads to better management, and family-owned firms that pass down control to the eldest son usually
do worse.
labor input. Something that is more general and endogenous to the firm is corporate cul-
ture. Our paper shows the importance of culture that is developed from coordination and
cooperation among the individuals which can help explain the performance differences
among seemingly similar enterprises.
Corporations evolve through different phases as they develop. At the initial stage,
the coordination and the cooperation phases have long-lasting effects on corporate per-
formance. Consider the following thought exercise: At the initial phase, an organization
deals with many coordination problems. Members in the organization may come from
different social cultures, experiences, ethics, linguistics, or educational backgrounds. Is
working overtime expected? Should people work individually or in teams? Is email an
acceptable form of communication? It may take some time before the organization es-
tablishes a particular corporate culture. We denote this phase as the coordination phase.
After corporate culture matures, individuals can choose to cooperate or to defect for self-
benefit. For example, if email has become an acceptable form of communication even in
urgent matters, one employee may deny receiving it when it is to his advantage to do
so. Or the culture could be such that the management usually gives proper credit to
subordinates, but takes sole credit when an extraordinary idea is suggested. We denote
this as the cooperation phase. Our experiment replicates a similar time line. We show,
in a laboratory setting, that we can endogenously generate different corporate cultures
for a group in the coordination phase by using different organizational structures, and
predict their individual behavior in the cooperation phase.
In short, our experiment shows the following two main results. First, to show that
organizations with competitive institutional design are more likely to have better coordi-
nation, and, in turn, better performance outcome, we show that that competition leads to
higher minimum effort levels in the minimum effort coordination game. Next, to support
the theory that the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games acts as a focal
point in the cooperation phase, we show that organizations with higher minimum effort
in the coordination game also have a higher rate of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game, and, in turn, a better performance outcome. These two endogenous features have
significant performance differences in our experiment.
1.1 Corporate Culture
Corporate culture is broadly defined as “the specific collection of values and norms that
are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they inter-
act with each other...” (Hill and Jones 2001). Corporate culture is undeniably prevalent
and influential. Many organizational theorists have studied the psychological and soci-
ological impacts and the measurements of corporate culture (e.g., Cameron and Quinn
(2005), Kotter and Haskett (1992), Sorensen (2002)) and some have studied formation of
norms (Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1991), and Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985)).
Southwest Airline once used an ad depicting a multiple choice exam which question asked
“A customer forgets to pack extra baby formula and has an hour layover in Albuquerque.
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What do you do?” (Figure 1). The choices of answers were a) Wish her luck, b) Suggest
an excellent restaurant across town, or c) Go find some formula and pick up a coloring
book for her older child. Answer c) is going beyond what is expected of an employee at
a typical airline but it portrays that Southwest airline’s culture is to do exactly that: go
beyond what is expected (Camerer and Malmendier 2007).
Another example is the culture at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).
Although not a corporation in the usual sense, Caltech operates under a honor code
system that states that a student will not take advantage of another Caltech member.
Students from other universities may have hard time grasping the concept and how it
is enforced. However, Caltech’s honor code system works extremely well; students are
usually given take home exams that may be timed or un-timed, closed or open book, but
ultimately self administered.2 Lastly, one of the most important cultural understandings
of the US military is the retrieval of US soldiers. If there is even a remote chance that
a fellow soldier is alive, the soldiers do everything within their means to save the fellow
soldier, even if it threatens additional lives. This type of culture helped develop the
US military to be the most elite all-volunteer military force in the world. Consider for
a second that the corporate culture was to leave the soldier behind enemy lines. How
dedicated would the soldier be in dangerous missions?
Figure 1: Ad from Southwest Airline Inflight Magazine
2Having done my undergrad education at another university and being an economist, I too was very
surprised by Caltech’s system. However, I too saw myself self-enforcing the honor code system.
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Although it is not as widely studied nor as mature as it is in management science,
economists have begun to acknowledge that corporate culture is an integral part of study-
ing the theory of firm. Culture is studied indirectly by using a relational contract in a
repeated game theory framework (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002). It is also studied
in a direct manner: Kreps (1990) emphasized the culture as a focal point (Schelling 1960),
Cremer (1993) and Cremer (1986) viewed culture as an investment, and Hermalin (2001)
argued culture as an efficiency improving mechanism. Hermalin (In Press) provides a
helpful literature review of where the economic field is in terms of corporate culture.
Furthermore, experimental economists contributed to a complementary ways of study-
ing corporate culture. Feiler and Camerer (In Press) and Weber and Camerer (2003)
have conducted an experimental study of how firms may endogenously create codes to
communicate and how mergers will create a disruption in production due to “language
barrier” in codes.
Although corporate cultures can be seen as a firm-specific technology, it cannot be
easily transferred or purchased even in similar industries.3 These literature all point to
the crucial roles corporate culture plays in affecting corporate performance. First, it is
a cheap way of increasing productivity. For example, having a well-implemented culture
of “do no evil”, like Google, Inc., can reduce principal’s monitoring cost. Second, it
provides us researchers with an equilibrium prediction. With a good understanding of
the culture, we can better predict whether the members in the organization will be more
self-serving or cooperative.
1.2 Overview of the Paper
In this paper, we use both game theory and experimental economics approaches to
demonstrate two relationships between corporate culture and PPD among SSE. First,
we show that competition leads to better coordination in the minimum effort coordi-
nation game: organizations with institutional design that induces competition are more
likely to have better coordination. This result is consistent with previous findings where
competition provides higher performance, such as in the tournament structure (Lazear
and Rosen 1981) or managerial performance (Bloom and van Reenen 2007). Further-
more, we show that stronger coordination also leads to higher rate of cooperation in the
prisoner’s dilemma game, even when non-cooperation is individually beneficial. In sum,
we show that high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games act as a focal point
for the outcome of a subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game.
We operationalize minimum effort coordination games as organizations’ coordination
problems, and prisoner’s dilemma game as cooperation problems. We have two experi-
mental treatments for the coordination phase: competitive and non-competitive setting.
In the competitive treatment, there are two firms, where firms are independently playing
the minimum effort coordination game. In the non-competitive setting, there is only
3It is probably harder for a similar industry to adopt since there is a first mover’s advantage.
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one firm. In both treatments, there are external investors whose payoff is determined by
the performance of the firm. Furthermore, the investment linearly increases the payoff
for the workers in the firm, and they know the investment prior to any decision mak-
ing. As will be detailed in the experimental design section, this procedure is done to
control for risk-dominance. Our experimental design benefited greatly from Bornstein,
Gneezy, and Nagel (2002)’s (BGN) experiment that supports the idea that competition
can improve coordination. Three major differences distinguish our research from BGN’s.
First, as mentioned, we control for risk-dominance in the competition setting. Second,
our investment is constructed endogenously and is more aligned with the principal-agent
framework. Lastly, both the competitive and non-competitive setting has investors in our
design, providing a way to compare one-firm and two-firm treatments. Our design also
benefited from results by Brandts and Cooper (2006) and Hamman, Rick, and Weber
(2007) (HRW). Both papers are excellent experimental papers that study the relation-
ship between effort choices and exogenous one-time changes to the payoff function. Here,
exogenous change means that the change is not controlled by anyone participating in the
experiment. Brandts and Cooper and HRW showed that, after observing coordination
failure, periodic and exogenous changes of the payoff function in a non-affine manner4
to increase the benefits from coordinating (compared to previous period’s payoff) im-
prove coordination. Adapting from their studies, our experiment deals with endogenous
changes and affine transformations to the payoff function. We show that the effort levels
from the competitive setting stochastically dominate the non-competitive setting. Inter-
estingly, the distribution of effort levels from the one-firm treatment is not statistically
different from the distribution of effort levels made by the lower performing firm in the
competitive setting. Furthermore, even though the experiment was designed so that the
investors cannot lose any of their investments, we observe that the investors do not fully
invest their endowment in the poor performing firm even in the non-competitive setting.
This punishment mechanism does not increase the effort levels.
Similar to Knez and Camerer (2000)’s design, given that the corporation has devel-
oped a culture of high levels of coordination, we also find that this induces the agents to
be more likely to cooperate even in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Our paper
provides a stronger result in that our prisoner’s dilemma game is a one-shot game rather
than a repeated game. Furthermore, unlike Knez and Camerer (2000), our organization
for the coordination game consists of group size strictly greater than 2.5 When we present
the subjects with a prisoner’s dilemma game which is played with another member from
the group with whom they played the coordination game, cooperation is approximately
30% more likely than defection when there is a higher level of coordination.6
4A non-affine transformation may change risk-domiance. An affine function is a function that is both
concave and convex.
5A problem with having a coordination game with group size of 2 is that the individuals coordinate
very well. Therefore, Knez’s study was not able to get much variation in level of coordination (they all
fully coordinated) to genuinely study the relationship between coordination and cooperation.
6One caveat we like to acknowledge from the start is that an experiment conducted at an university
with group of students cannot fully generalize the complexity of standard organization in the business
world. For example, this experiment is done without communication which surely exist in a typical
corporation. However, one of the objectives of this paper is to study how the initial equilibrium se-
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1.3 Agenda
The paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce the general setup and review of the
game of interest. Then we present the experimental design and the main hypotheses. We
then follow with detailed analysis in the result section. We finish with a summarizing
conclusion.
lection of an organization effects the future selections. When an organization first begins, there is a
coordination problem (due to language barrier, cultural differences, jargons, etc.) which becomes an
obstacle to communication. One can see this no-communication experiment as an extreme version of
that scenario. There have been studies which state that student’s behavior at the lab is a good predictor
of professional’s behavior in these abstract settings (Ball and Cech 1996) but further studies of how
the short-run organizational behavior in lab will generalize to the long-run organizational behavior is
definitely needed. Experiments are extreme simplifications but that is their advantage. We view exper-
iments as another form of methodology to gain data and insights. By using this controlled and simple
environment, we are able to better understand how certain features will effect the organization.
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2 General Setup and Review
2.1 Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Minimum effort coordination game (MECG, and also known as the weak-link game) takes
the following form: Given N agents, every agent chooses an effort level ei ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},
M finite, with payoff function
pi = α
(
min
j∈N
{ej}
)
− β(ei) + δ where α > β > 0, δ ∈ R for all agents i ∈ N (1)
Best response in this game is for agent i to match the lowest effort from everyone else:
ei = min
j∈N\i
{ej}
Hence, there are M many pure strategy equilibria: everyone choosing ei = 1, everyone
choosing ei = 2 and so on. Let’s consider an example of which M = 7, α = 400, β =
200, and δ = 1100. The game can be then summarized by Table 1.
Minimum effort of all the agents
Agent i’s effort 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 2500 2100 1700 1300 900 500 100
6 - 2300 1900 1500 1100 700 300
5 - - 2100 1700 1300 900 500
4 - - - 1900 1500 1100 700
3 - - - - 1700 1300 900
2 - - - - - 1500 1100
1 - - - - - - 1300
Table 1: Minimum Effort Coordination Game Payoff for Agent i
This game has several features. First off, it has 7 pure strategy Nash Equilibria: ei = 1
∀i ∈ N , ei = 2 ∀i ∈ N , ..., ei = 7 ∀i ∈ N . An interesting question to address in games
with multiple equilibria is the equilibrium selection. However, given this particular game
structure with strict Nash Equilibria, many of the standard notions of refinements, such
as trembling hand perfection, will not help to reduce any equilibria. Using the reasoning of
Harsanyi and Selton (1988), we are able to focus on two particularly interesting equilibria:
the payoff dominant equilibrium and the risk dominant equilibrium. Everyone choosing
effort level 7 is the payoff dominant equilibrium since this equilibrium pareto dominates
all other equilibria. Choosing an effort level 1 is the least-efficient equilibrium but it
can be seen as maximizing the worst-case scenario. In terms of Harsanyi and Selten,
this equilibrium is the risk dominant equilibrium; by choosing an effort level of 1, the
agent minimizes the uncertainty and, in MECG, secures a specific payoff regardless of
the actions of other agents. Harsanyi and Selten further argue that payoff dominance
should be the first criterion applied.
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However, in tacit environment, experiments have shown that people fail to coordinate
to a payoff dominant equilibrium. Rather they end up at the risk dominant equilibrium.
The leading example is produced by van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) (VHBB). In
VHBB’s experiment, participants played the minimum effort coordination game without
communication. The only statistics observable by the participant was the minimum
effort of the group. The size of the group consisted of 14-16 participants and each were
instructed to choose an integer effort level of 1 to 7 with 1 being the risk dominant
and 7 being the payoff dominant equilibrium. In this and other similar experiments (See
Camerer (2003) for survey), the game generally converges to a minimum effort of 1 by the
5th period when N > 3. One of the intuitions behind this experimental result is strategic
uncertainty. In short, strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty arising from not knowing
which equilibrium strategy the other players will implement. The strategic uncertainty
increases as the group size increases (N increases) since agents now have more people to
consider, and as the number of strategies increase (M increases) since the agent now has
more Nash Equilibria to consider.
One of the leading theories of behavior we observe in these experiments is provided
by Crawford, who uses the adaptive learning framework to explain the data for VHBB
(Crawford 1995). After observing the minimum effort level that is weakly lower than
the effort level any one agent has chosen (ei = minj∈N\i{ej}), the agent uses the new
information to update his next period strategy, in turn, converging to a minimum effort
level of 1.
Two questions one might ask are 1. what would happen if group size is N ≤ 3?
and 2. if the distribution of choices were available instead of just the minimum effort
statistics? VHBB also addresses those two questions. When the group size is small,
the participants coordinate very well. However, with a bigger group size, showing the
distribution of choices does not improve coordination. This can be because when the
group size is small, there is hope in leading by example and being patient. However,
when the group size is ‘big’, seeing the distribution of many low-effort levels is not much
of an encouragement.
Many variations of the minimum effort coordination game have shown improvement
of minimum effort in addition to the papers pervious mentioned by Bornstein, Gneezy,
and Nagel (2002), Brandts and Cooper (2006), and Hamman, Rick, and Weber (2007).
For example, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992) showed that having a non-
binding pregame communication improves coordination. Even without communication,
Weber (2006) provides an experimental result where one slowly grows the organization to
improve coordination. Schmidt, Shupp, Walker, and Ostrom (2003) provide experimental
data that shows coordination improves when risk dominance is weaker. Furthermore,
Cachon and Camerer (1996) showed that people coordinate better when they are charged
a fee to participate which leads to losses of money in poor equilibrium (loss-avoidance).
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2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Given the heavy exposure of prisoner’s dilemma game, we will not cover the related
literature in this paper. However, we briefly touch on the game in the experimental
design section.
9
3 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at 2 laboratories: the Social Science Experimental
Laboratory (SSEL) at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), Pasadena, CA,
and the California Social Science Laboratory (CASSEL) at the University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA). A total of 128 subjects participated in the experiments. The
average performance-based payment was 19USD. All students were registered subjects
with SSEL / CASSEL (signed a general consent form) and the experiment was approved
by the local research ethics committee at both universities. These labs consist of over 30
working computers divided into cubical setting, which prevents the students from viewing
another student’s screen.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). The instructions were available both in print as well as on screen
for the participants and the Experimenter explained the instructions in detail out-loud.
Participants were also given a brief quiz after instruction to insure proper understanding
of the game and the software. A sample instruction that was provided to the participants
is on author’s website.
The subjects were randomly assigned their roles in the experiment and did not change
their roles for the entire experiment. Furthermore, no subjects participated in more than
one experiment. The identity of the participants as well as their individual decisions were
kept as private information. However, each group knew the total investment their group
received, their own group’s minimum effort (not the other group’s effort level), and the
investors only knew their own investment level as well as the minimum effort of all the
groups. The experiment used fictitious currency called francs and the expected payment
for the investors and group members were comparable. The participants were told that
the experiment consisted of undetermined number of rounds to prevent end game effect.
All participants filled out a survey immediately after the experiment.
Terminology: In terms of terminology, we avoided any priming effects by using
neutral language during the experiment. More specifically, we used language such as
groups and numbers instead of firms and effort levels. For consistency of this paper, we
will refer to groups as firms and investors henceforth. The members in a firm will be
called workers. However, we can consider these not only as firms but also as different
divisions within a firm. In other words, this setting can be applied to both inter- and
intra-organization levels. Lastly, we will refer to the number chosen by the subject as
effort level throughout the paper.
3.1 Two-Firm (Competitive) Treatment
Below is the sequence of the experiment.
1. Investors privately decide on how much to invest in Firm 1 and Firm 2.
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2. The workers observe the aggregate investment for their firm.
3. The workers privately select a number between 1 - 7.
4. The minimum number for each firm is shown to the investors along with their
current period payoff and total payoff.
5. The workers are shown the minimum number selected with their own firm. In
addition, the workers are shown their individual payoff for the current period and
the total payoff.
6. The period comes to an end and the next period begins.
7. Experiment concludes at an indefinite period.
We conducted 4 sessions of the two-firm treatment (3 at UCLA and 1 at Caltech).
Subjects in the two-firm treatment were divided into three groups: Firm 1, Firm 2, and
Investors. Each of the firms had 6 workers and there were total of 4 investors.
Investors: In each period, investors were given 100 francs to invest. Investors were
allowed to invest in any combination such that for any investor i, investment to Firm 1 is
I i1 ≥ 0, investment to Firm 2 is I i2 ≥ 0 and I i1 + I i2 ≤ 100. Investors kept any endowment
not invested. The payoffs from the investment were determined by the performance of
the two firms
R
(
min
i∈firm1
{ei}
)
× I i1 +R
(
min
j∈firm2
{ej}
)
× I i2 (2)
where R(min{ei}) represents the following multiplier in Table 2.
min{ei} 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
R(min{ei}) 2.5 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.5 1.25 1.0
Table 2: Multiplier for R(min{ei}) for Both Firms
These multipliers are standard in experimental economics, such as the trust game,
centipede game, and many others. Notice that investors cannot lose money from invest-
ment and it is weakly dominant to always invest.
Workers: Each firm consisted of 6 people and the composition of the firm did not
change for the entire experiment. The workers played the MECG explained before with
the following variation. Worker i in firm j was choosing a number ei ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} with
his payoff given by
pi = 400
(
min
i∈N
ei
)
− 200ei + 1100 + Ij (3)
where Ij =
∑
k∈investors I
k
j , the sum of total investment made to the firm j. Notice
that the best response does not change: ei = minj∈N\i{ej}. Furthermore, the entire
equilibrium structure remains the same. In particular, risk dominance is invariant with
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respect to isomorphisms (Harsanyi and Selton 1988). The worker’s payoff matrix can
be summarized by Table 3. These parameters were chosen so that in the worst case the
worker will end with at least 100 francs and not a negative amount. This is to reduce
confounding effects such as loss aversion.
The design choice was made with simplicity in mind. Obviously, there are more
complex contracts that can induce better performance than a fixed-wage contract, such
as an option-based or benchmark contract. Our goal was to design a simple wage schedule
that is less likely to induce coordination improvement. The focus of the study is not
whether different contracts can induce coordination but whether competition can help
improve coordination. We want to minimize the confounding effects. The design of the
Ij parameters were again chosen for simplicity of computation during the experiment,
as well as to not change the risk dominance of the game. Instead of using the payoff
to workers pi = 400 (mini∈N ei) − 200ei + 1100 + Ij, we could have also used the payoff
pi = 400 (mini∈N ei) − 200ei + 1100 + IjN , but there is no a priori reason to think scalar
multiplication of investment will make a difference. The profit function for firm j which
constructs the model above is
∏
j = Ij(R(min(ei)) + 6) + 6(αmin(ei) + δ) and was not
shown to the subjects in the experiment.
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3.2 One-Firm (Non-Competitive) Treatment
The one-firm treatment is identical to the two-firm treatment except that there is now
only one firm. We conducted 4 sessions of the one-firm treatment (3 at UCLA and 1 at
Caltech). Again, the equilibrium structure does not change. The comparison between
the design of the two treatments can be summarized by the Table 4.
Two-Firm Treatment One-Firm Treatment
Investor’s Choice: Firm 1, Firm 2, Firm 1
How much to invest in and Nobody and Nobody
Performance knowledge Investors: All Investors: All
Workers: Own Firm Workers: Own Firm
Investment Knowledge Own Firm Own Firm
Can investors lose money? No No
Table 4: Comparing the Two-Firm and One-Firm Treatments
3.3 Standard Treatment
We ran 2 sessions at UCLA and 2 at Caltech of the standard minimum effort coordination
game using the payoff from Table 1.
3.4 Cooperation Design
We used a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game to test whether subjects are more likely to
cooperate (Table 5).
Your pair’s decision
A B
Your decision
A $3, $3 $1, $4
B $4, $1 $2, $2
Table 5: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
We did not inform the subjects beforehand that they would be playing a prisoner’s
dilemma game. The subjects were randomly (anonymously) matched to one other person
from the same group that they were part of during the coordination game. For example,
someone from Firm 1 was paired with another person from Firm 1. Subjects were clearly
told that this was being played only once and we have obtained the data from the
cooperation design only from the UCLA subjects.7 We chose the prisoner’s dilemma game
7We only obtained the data from UCLA because this part of the experiment was incorporated after
we had already finished running the experiments at Caltech.
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because this game has one pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is dominant solvable. In
the example from Table 5, the pareto-efficient outcome is to cooperate-cooperate but it
is not an equilibrium. Nash equilibrium is to chose B. Following the standard prisoner’s
dilemma terminology, we consider choosing A as cooperating while choosing strategy B
as not cooperating. Given the structure of the game, choosing to cooperate in one shot
prisoner’s dilemma provides a strong result.
3.5 Hypothesis
For the coordination phase, we tested whether the workers in the two-firm treatment
coordinated better than in the one-firm treatment. Better coordination can mean three
things: 1. achieve higher minimum effort level, 2. achieve lower wasted effort, or 3.
achieve faster convergence to an equilibrium. For consistency with other literatures, we
are referring to higher minimum effort level when we state that some setting has a better
coordination. However, we will show that there is no difference in wasted effort and rate
of convergence between different settings in the result section. For the cooperation phase,
we test whether subjects coming from a better-coordinating firm are also more likely to
cooperate.
Hypothesis 1 Higher Minimum Effort. Subjects in the two-firm treatment will choose
higher minimum effort level than the one-firm treatment.
Hypothesis 2 Likelihood of Cooperation. Subjects are more likely to cooperate in the
prisoner’s dilemma game if they have also coordinated well in the MECG.
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4 Results
4.1 Two Firm
Figure 2 and 3 show the summary results aggregated over all four sessions of the two-firm
treatment. For the analysis, we have separated the sample into two sets. The first set,
denoted higher performing firm, consists of firms that had higher minimum effort for a
given session. The second set, denoted lower performing firm, is the complement set
of the higher performing firm. Of the two firms per session, we define a firm as higher
performing if it achieves a higher minimum effort by period 5. There were no cases in
which a firm with a higher effort by period 5 ended up having a lower minimum effort at
any time from period 5 to 10 (10 being the last period).
We observe that mean choice of effort was between 6-3 with all firms, while the
mean choice of effort was between 6-4 and 5-2 for the higher and lower performing firm,
respectively (Figure 3). The average minimum effort was between 3-4 with all firms, while
the average minimum effort was between 3-5 and 1-3 for the higher and lower performing
firm, respectively (Figure 2). We compared the distribution of average choice per period
of each subsample to show that the difference in performance between higher and lower
performing firms is statistically significant. Table 6 contains the results from the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Furthermore, Figure 4 graphs the kernel estimated
cumulative distribution function of each of the subsamples. Results from the KS test
and the CDF graph show that the higher performing firm indeed chose statistically
significantly higher (p-value of 0) effort levels than the lower performing firm.8 Lastly,
we conclude from Table 7, a cross-sectional time series FGLS regression for average effort
level, that average effort level for period t is predominately determined by firm’s previous
period’s minimum effort (coefficient: 0.699 for higher performing firm and 0.91 for the
lower performing firm), and minimally, but statically significantly, determined by the
percent wealth invested to the firm. The effect of investment for the higher performing
firms is negative (coefficient: -0.016) while for the lower performing firm is positive
(coefficient: 0.0145). This is because there is an upper and lower bound to the possible
effort and investment level. The investors will end up investing 100% of their wealth in
the higher performing firm, so decrease in average effort in time will show up as a negative
effect. Yet, the investors have no reason to shift their investment from higher performing
to lower performing firm as long as the higher performing firm is indeed outperforming
the lower firm. Also, as the average effort approaches 1 for the lower performing firm,
even modest investment will show up as a positive effect.
Table 8 and 9 further analyzes the investment behavior. Although investors start out
by investing 50-50 between both firms9, Table 8 shows that on the last period, over 98%
of the wealth is invested to the higher performing firm. These means are significantly
8The cdf of the higher performing firm stochastically dominates the cdf of the lower performing firm.
9From Figure 2 and 3, it may seem as if the investors invested more in the lower performing firm at
first but that is not the case. The investors did invest 50-50 but did not invest their entire endowment
in the first period
16
Figure 2: Average Minimum Effort for Two-Firm Treatment
Smaller group D P-value
2 firm setting: higher of the two per session lower 1 0
vs higher 0 1
2 firm setting: lower of the two per session Combined K-S 1 0
2 firm setting: both firms 1 firm 0.567 0.008
vs 2 firm -0.033 0.983
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.567 0.012
2 firm setting: only higher of the two per session 1 firm 0.9 0
vs 2 firm 0 1
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.9 0
2 firm setting: only lower of the two per session 1 firm 0.3 0.407
vs 2 firm -0.1 0.905
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.3 0.418
Table 6: Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: Average Effort Choice Per Period
17
Figure 3: Mean Choice of Effort for Two-Firm Treatment
18
Figure 4: Kernel Estimated CDF of Average Effort Choice
cdf2h is the CDF of the higher performing firm from the two-firm treatment. cdf2l is the CDF of the lower performing firm
from the two-firm treatment. cdf2 is the CDF of the two-firm treatment and cdf1 is the CDF of the one-firm treatment.
These CDFs were generated using the Kernel estimation.
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different (p<0.000). Another important feature is that the investors invest their entire
endowment, which is not the case in the one-firm treatment. Table 9 suggests that the
investment behavior at period t is not driven by the firm’s minimum effort in period t−1
but by the difference in the two firm’s minimum effort in period t − 1. The difference
in the two firm’s minimum effort is higher performing firm’s minimum effort minus the
lower performing firm’s minimum effort. Unsurprisingly, the investment has gravitated
towards the higher performing firm such that bigger differences in minimum effort level
cause bigger differences in investment level.
Subject Categories Mean SE Min Max Obs P-value
Higher performing firm 98.313 1.305 94.5 100 4
0
Lower performing firm 1.688 1.305 0 5.5 4
All firms 100 0 100 100 8
Ho: mean(higher performing) - mean(lower performing) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics & T-Test of % Wealth Invested in Two-Firm Treatment
at Last Period
21
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s:
In
ve
st
m
en
t
1
F
ir
m
2
F
ir
m
(h
ig
h
er
p
er
fo
rm
er
)
2
F
ir
m
(l
ow
er
p
er
fo
rm
er
)
2
F
ir
m
(d
iff
er
en
ce
)
C
on
st
an
t
51
.2
29
**
*
54
.2
65
**
*
45
.6
15
**
*
24
.5
36
*
(6
.4
12
)
(1
2.
99
0)
(1
1.
94
2)
(1
4.
40
5)
F
ir
m
’s
m
in
im
u
m
(l
ag
1
p
er
io
d
)
11
.4
75
**
*
2.
21
9
-2
.2
4
(2
.4
68
)
(2
.9
83
)
(2
.7
12
)
M
in
im
u
m
d
iff
er
en
ce
(l
ag
1
p
er
io
d
)
7.
06
8*
*
-1
0.
12
2*
**
16
.5
87
**
*
(2
.8
18
)
(2
.9
83
)
(5
.0
51
)
C
om
m
on
A
R
(1
)
fo
r
al
l
p
an
el
s
0.
37
3
0.
58
3
0.
55
5
0.
58
3
L
og
li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
-1
44
.5
30
-1
48
.3
78
-1
46
.5
08
-1
72
.3
81
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
s:
36
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
an
el
s:
4.
T
im
e
p
er
io
d
:
9
*p
<
0.
1,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
**
*p
<
0.
01
.
(T
w
o-
ta
il
ed
te
st
).
N
u
m
b
er
s
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
ar
e
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
T
ab
le
9:
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
ti
on
al
T
im
e
S
er
ie
s
F
G
L
S
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
fo
r
In
ve
st
m
en
t
D
iff
er
en
ce
:
H
ig
h
er
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
fi
rm
-
L
o
w
er
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
fi
rm
22
4.2 One Firm
Figure 5 shows the summary results aggregated over all four sessions of the one-firm
treatment. Here we see that the mean choice (average minimum) effort level ranges from
2-5 (2-3). According to the FGLS of average effort level in Table 7, we find that the
average effort level is predominately determined by the firm’s minimum in the previous
period (coefficient: 0.917), while the percent of wealth invested only has a small but
statistically significant effect (coefficient: 0.013).
One might think that investors will always invest everything since they have nothing
to lose, given that they are guaranteed at least their investment in return (firm’s minimum
effort of 1). However, that is not the case. Investors start out by investing over 90% (not
100%) of their wealth in the first period and invest even smaller percentage of their wealth
in later periods. Referring to Table 10, by last period, the investors are only investing
on average of 66% of their wealth. If we subdivide the sample to two groups, firms with
minimum higher than 1 and firms with minimum equal to 1, we observe that the average
investment to the firm with minimum effort of 1 is only 37.75%. However, over 95% of the
wealth is invested whenever the firm’s minimum effort is greater than 1. The investment
level difference is statistically different at p-value of 0.047. In addition, according to
the FGLS in Table 9, we conclude that the investment is significantly driven by the
previous period’s firm’s minimum in a positive manner (coefficient: 11.47). Although we
cannot distinguish whether the lack of investment is due to spitefulness or a punishment
to encourage a higher effort level, we observe that there are lower investments to firms
performing poorly. However, withholding investment does not accomplish an increase in
effort level since, according to Table 7, the investment variable has a positive coefficient
of 0.013, which suggests that lowering investment does not increase average effort level.
Subject Categories Mean SE Min Max Obs P-value
Firms with min > 1 95.625 4.375 91.25 100 2
0.047
Firms with min = 1 37.75 12.250 25.5 50 2
All firms 66.688 17.531 25.5 100 4
Ho: mean(firms with min>1) - mean(firms with min=1) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics & T-Test of % Wealth Invested in One-Firm Treatment
at Last Period
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Figure 5: Mean Choice and Average Minimum Effort for One-Firm Treatment
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4.3 Two Firm vs One Firm
Recall that the difference between one-firm and two-firm treatment is on the investor’s
outside option depicted by Table 4. Figure 6 and 7 are the pooled graph from the one-
firm and two-firm treatment. An important feature of the graph is that the mean choice
(average minimum) of effort of the one-firm treatment is statistically no different from
the lower performing firm in the two-firm treatment. If there were no effects between
having two firms or one firm, we would expect that mean choice (average minimum)
of the one firm to be statistically no different compared to the mean choice (average
minimum) of both the higher and lower performing firms combined. Referring back to
Table 6, the two-sample K-S test comparing the distribution of average effort choices,
and Figure 4 (the CDF of average choices), we can make the following conclusions re-
garding the comparison of one-firm and two-firm treatment. First, we can reject the null
that the distributions from one-firm and two-firm treatment are not different (p<0.05).
Furthermore, we can state that the two-firm treatment stochastically dominates the one-
firm treatment (p<0.01). Next, when we compare the higher performing of the two-firm
treatment to one-firm treatment, we can reject the null at p-value of 0 that they have
the same distribution. In addition, we conclude that the higher performing of two-firm
treatment also dominates the one-firm treatment (p<0.01). However, when comparing
the lower performer of the two-firm treatment to the one-firm treatment, we cannot reject
the null that (i) the distributions are the same (p-value of 0.418), (ii) neither one-firm
treatment nor the lower performer dominate one another (p-value of 0.407 and 0.905,
respectively). In sum, our data supports hypothesis 1. The subjects in two-firm treat-
ment choose a higher minimum effort level than the one-firm treatment. Furthermore,
we observe that the results from the one-firm treatment are similar to the results from
the lower performing firm.
One reason why we might see such a difference between one-firm and two-firm treat-
ment is that workers start out with only about half of the wealth invested in each firm.
Therefore, they work “harder” to earn the rest of the investment. However, in the
one-firm treatment, they are offered almost the entire investment from the beginning.
Although, it does not change the fact that everyone exerting higher effort, in turn get-
ting a higher minimum effort, is pareto improvement regardless of the treatment, we
tested whether firms who had lower levels of initial investment also coordinate to the
higher minimum effort in the one-firm treatment. The idea is that the workers will work
“harder” to earn the rest of the investment. Our data shows that the initial investment
level has no significant effect on individual’s initial effort level. By regressing period 1’s
individual effort level on the first period’s investment10, we obtain a negative but statis-
tically insignificant coefficient of -0.0235 with SE of 0.04737. This is evidence against the
argument that workers are exerting higher efforts when they observe low investment in
the first period because they want to “earn” higher level of investment in the subsequent
period.
10Recall that investment decisions are made and shown to the workers before effort levels are chosen.
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Figure 6: Average Minimum Effort: One-Firm Treatment vs Two-Firm Treatment
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Figure 7: Mean Choice of Effort: One-Firm Treatment vs Two-Firm Treatment
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4.4 Wasted Effort
So far we have only considered having a higher minimum effort as an indicator of better
coordination. Table 11 and Figure 8 present the average wasted effort per period by each
individual. Comparing various combinations of two-firm treatment and one-firm treat-
ment, and just the high performer of two firm and low performer of two-firm treatment,
we do not get any statistically significant differences between the average wasted effort.
At best, the p-value is 0.372 and at worst, it is 0.9 in a two-tailed t-test. The average
wasted effort across both the one-firm and two-firm treatment is 1.033 per period with
standard error of 0.087. Therefore, we conclude that amount of effort wasted does not
vary much between treatments.
Mean SE Num of Obs P-value
(A) 2 firm setting 1.063 0.120 48 (A) & (B) 0.640
(B) 1 firm setting 0.975 0.109 24 (B) & (C) 0.9
(C) 2 firm setting (higher only) 0.954 0.124 24 (B) & (D) 0.404
(D) 2 firm setting (lower only) 1.171 0.206 24 (C) & (D) 0.372
everyone 1.033 0.087 72
Ho: mean(X) - mean(Y) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 11: T-Test: Average Wasted Effort Per Period
Figure 8: Average Wasted Effort Per Period
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4.5 Convergence
Another method in measuring coordination is the rate of convergence speed to an equilib-
rium. Figure 9 presents the average number of best responses per period. For example,
if the average rate of best response is 3, this means that on average, 3 agents are best
responding in that period. As the graph depicts, there are no major differences between
one-firm or two-firm treatment or between higher or lower performing firm. In all cases,
the average rate of best response starts out low, between 1-1.5, and converges to 3.5-4
by the end of the experiment. Therefore, we conclude that the rate of convergence speed
does not vary much between treatments.
Figure 9: Average Rate of Best Response
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4.6 Cooperation
Here, we address the relationship between the likelihood of cooperation conditioned on
a firm’s coordination outcome. Table 12 is the correlation matrix of our explanatory
variables. While one may think that the last period’s minimum effort from the coordina-
tion game would have the most significant relationship on cooperation, the first period’s
minimum effort decision had the strongest relationship (ρ = 0.296 and p-value of 0.018).
This may be the case because when the cooperation treatment was induced by pairing
the subjects randomly within the firm, the subjects are conditioning their expectation on
the how others behaved at the beginning of the coordination treatment. Not surprisingly,
the correlation between firm’s minimum effort at period 1 has correlation of 0.77 with
firm’s minimum effort at period 10.
pd gpmin1 gpmin10 gender exptype p1 p10
pd 1
gpmin1 0.296** 1
gpmin10 0.227* 0.772*** 1
gender 0.244* -0.196 -0.238* 1
exptype 0.143 0.346*** 0 -0.011 1
p1 0.037 0.556*** 0.422*** -0.144 0.168 1
p10 0.197 0.726*** 0.916*** -0.262** 0.022 0.409*** 1
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test); n=64
Table 12: Correlation Relationship
By running a logit regression of cooperation (1 if cooperated and 0 otherwise, Table
13) we are able to make the following conclusions. When looking at the sole effect of
individual effort choice, this has no significant effects to the likelihood of cooperation.
However, when looking at the sole effect of firm’s minimum on the first period, this has
a positive significant effect (coefficient: 0.398) on the likelihood of cooperation. This
may suggest that the individual’s likelihood of cooperation is not based on whether the
individual is likely to put in high effort in the first period but whether he comes from
a firm that coordinated well. When looking at the multivariable logit regression, we
can make the following conclusions. First, the three significant variables are individual
choice in period 1 (coefficient: 0.723), firm’s minimum in period 1 (coefficient: 2.88),
and the interaction effect of firm’s minimum in period 1 with individual effort in period
1 (coefficient: -0.424). This result suggests that people who chose higher effort levels in
first period are also more likely to choose to cooperate. Furthermore, when a firm has
a higher minimum effort, workers in that firm are more likely to choose to cooperate.
Therefore, it is not that the subjects are trying to take advantage of fellow subjects who
seem to be more trusting, but instead are choosing to cooperate. However, when looking
at the interaction effect which has a negative coefficient, this suggests that a person who
initially chose a high effort and was damaged by low firm’s minimum effort is more likely
to choose to defect.11 The variables relating to period 10’s efforts are not significant.
11Recall that p1 ≥ gpmin1. Therefore, this does not state the converse which suggests that people
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Ind. Variable Dependent Variable: PD = 1 if cooperate and PD = 0 if defect
Constant -0.725 -1.215** -1.809*** -1.291** -5.217**
(0.777) (0.534) (0.647) (0.520) (2.289)
p1 0.041 0.723*
(0.140) (0.408)
p10 0.228 -0.532
(0.147) (0.443)
gpmin1 0.398** 2.880***
(0.173) (0.935)
gpmin10 0.302* 0.003
(0.169) (1.248)
gpmin1xp1 -0.434***
(0.160)
gpmin1xgpmin10 0.126
(0.233)
Number of Obs 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.030 0.068 0.039 0.205
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test).
numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Table 13: Logit Regression: Cooperation
We further subdivide the population to different groups based on effort levels to
determine the types and proportion of the subgroup who cooperate in Figure 10 and
11 and Table 14 and 15 to supplement the result from the logit regression on Table 13.
The results from Figure 10 and Table 14 support the idea that people who come from
firms with higher minimum efforts are more likely to cooperate than those from lower
minimum efforts. This occurs in two ways. First, when comparing between groups, for
example min < j to min ≥ j, there generally is a statistically significant effect that min
≥ j has higher proportion of cooperation. Secondly, when comparing within groups, for
example min < j to min < j + 1, although the effects are not statistically significant,
we do observe the the proportion of cooperation is higher for min < j + 1. In terms
of individual choices, the results from Figure 11 and Table 15 supports that individual
effort choices are a poor predictor of the proportion of cooperation.
who initially chosen low effort and realized that gpmin1 was higher than his effort are more likely to
take advantage of fellow workers in the cooperation treatment.
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Figure 10: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period Firm’s Minimum
First Period Firm Min % Cooperated SE Num of Obs P-value
min<2 0.1667 0.0904 18
0.0315
min>1 0.4565 0.0743 46
min<3 0.1667 0.0777 24
0.0071
min>2 0.5000 0.0801 40
min<4 0.2778 0.0757 36
0.0704
min>3 0.5000 0.0962 28
min<5 0.3095 0.0722 42
0.1393
min>4 0.5000 0.1091 22
everyone 0.3750 0.0610 64
Ho: mean(min<i) - mean(min>(i-1)) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 14: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period Firm’s Minimum
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Figure 11: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period’s Individual Choice
First Period Individual Choice % Cooperated SE Num of Obs P-value
choice<2 0.3333 0.3333 3
0.8810
choice>1 0.3770 0.0626 61
choice<3 0.1250 0.1250 8
0.1222
choice>2 0.4107 0.0663 56
choice<4 0.2308 0.1216 13
0.2355
choice>3 0.4118 0.0696 51
choice<5 0.3158 0.1096 19
0.5325
choice>4 0.4000 0.0739 45
choice<6 0.4242 0.0874 33
0.4092
choice>5 0.3226 0.0853 31
choice<7 0.4103 0.0798 39
0.4747
choice>6 0.3200 0.0952 25
everyone 0.3750 0.0610 64
Ho: mean(min<i) - mean(min>(i-1)) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 15: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period’s Choice
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5 Conclusion
We set out to study the relationship of persistent performance differences among seem-
ingly similar enterprises and used corporate culture as part of the explanation. We
defined corporate culture as the ability to coordinate and cooperate. Our contributions
are twofold: The experimental results support that competition significantly improves
coordination which pareto improves everyone’s payoff. Furthermore, this increase in co-
ordination also improves the likelihood of cooperating even when defecting is individually
beneficial. That is also a pareto improvement in everyone’s payoff. An organizational
culture of coordinating to an efficient outcome determines the ability to cooperate even
when there is no monitoring by the principal. We conclude that the results provided
in our experiment supports the theory that the endogenous features of culture devel-
oped from coordination and cooperation can help explain the persistent performance
differences.
As economists, not only are we concerned with existence of equilibrium and its selec-
tion but also efficiency. We have shown that in the coordination game we have studied,
higher levels of coordination lead to higher social surplus. Hence the natural question
to ask is how to improve coordination and we have provided one way in doing so. In
the prisoner’s dilemma game, the pareto-efficient outcome is not an equilibrium, but an
organization was better able to achieve such outcome for greater social surplus due to
the institutional design and corporate culture.
There are many open questions left in this field of study. For example, one can start
focusing on different types of contracts for coordination. Furthermore, unlike our design,
it would be interesting to see how well the firms in one-firm treatment will coordinate if
the investors are not allowed to invest until the 5th period. Of course, the idea of studying
coordination and cooperation in organization can be extended to different games as well,
such as, the battle of the sexes and the trust game in different organizational structure.
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